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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: CAsEs, CoMMENTS & QuESTIONS. By William 
B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, and Jesse H. Choper. St. Paul: West Pub~ 
lishing Co. 1¢4. lxiii + 1424 pages. $15 .oo. 
Many teachers despair, I suspect, of finding a suitable vehicle for a 
critical examination of constitutional law in the basic course. Even the 
best casebooks focus so sharply on broken series of factual resolutions 
that, no matter how well the cases are grouped, the gaps can sometimes 
be bridged only by an undesirable amount of lecturing which tends to 
be superficial. Treatises in constitutional law bring to the subject a meas~ 
ure of coherence and continuity lacking in case books, but the demand for 
economy has apparently made it infeasible to consider adequately all 
that a given teacher regards as relevant. In any case, constitutional law 
treatises are scarcely suitable for classroom use. 
It is probably true that only in the vast periodical literature of consti~ 
tutionallaw can a critical examination of that law be found. Few teach~ 
ers can afford the luxury of binding much of that literature for use by 
students, however, and few students have the time to wade through much 
of it on their own. Usually, selections from periodicals are mere asides 
in casebooks, passed off in string citations at the end of the cases. Occa~ 
sionally, some teachers mimeograph selected bibliographies of their own, 
to which they more or less "expect" their students to attend. The expec~ 
tation is always uncertain, however, and probably less warranted than 
we like to presume in easing our conscience. 
Considerations such as these, plus the sheer enormity of the subject, 
may account for something approaching a consensus of resignation about 
the basic constitutional law course: circumstances have apparently re~ 
duced our opportunity to one of presenting an adequate survey of the 
law. The special pleasures of critical examination seem reserved for en~ 
joyment only in advanced courses and seminars. We compensate for the 
infirmities of the basic course by proliferating electives in privacy, race 
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relations, problems of church and state, the business of the Supreme 
Court, and so on. 
With these considerations in mind, the editors' prefatory claim for 
this new casebook may seem a little brash. Dean Lockhart and Professors 
Kamisar and Choper boldly declare that their primary aim is "to stimu-
late critical examination of the law and the trends.m Thus, the claim is 
that this casebook offers a great deal more than a mere survey of consti-
tutional law. The surprise, however, is not that the claim is made; it is 
rather that the editors have actually succeeded in accomplishing their 
aim so very, very well! They have done so principally by devoting much 
of their materials to incisive periodical commentary and to the statement 
of questions which strenuously test the scope, significance, and articu-
lated rationale of the cases. In short, they have succeeded in blending 
some of the best constitutional law literature with a variety of informed, 
significant questions and a judicious selection of cases; the result is ex-
cellent. The blend is almost certain to force a high level of classroom 
dialogue; it should indeed stimulate critical examination of the law. 
It is therefore a pleasure to be able to recommend this book. Even in 
schools where the few hours assigned to constitutional law will restrict 
the basic course to more of a survey than the scope of this book comfort-
ably contemplates, the teacher should still find it most helpful in prepar-
ing his own notes. 
In other respects the book is orthodox. It is a useful orthodoxy, none-
theless, and the book can hardly be criticized on that account. Its organi-
zation, for instance, follows the currently standard tripartite division: 
The nature and scope of judicial review; the sources, uses, and interaction 
of national and state powers; and the limitations on governmental power 
resulting from the first eight amendments and the civil war amend-
ments. Subdivisions within the principal sections are also made along 
lines currently observed in other, widely adopted, casebooks. The selec-
tion of cases differs in some particulars from that of other casebooks, of 
course, just as other casebooks differ among themselves. But each of us 
can determine the comparative merits of these differences only after a 
more personal inspection of the book than can be secured vicariously 
from the bias of a review such as this. The point to be made here is 
simply that the book is more than good enough to merit that inspection. 
Nor should consideration of this book be dropped merely because the 
book is lengthy, which it clearly is. The use of small print and double 
columns makes it even longer than the number of pages (1424) might 
suggest. Nevertheless, the rampant growth of constitutional law today 
1. P. ix. 
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simply rules out any greater economy of style, especially since the editors 
have been true to their aim of stimulating a critical examination of that 
law. Additionally, the topical arrangement of subjects facilitates drop-
ping particular sections from a course where everything cannot be cov-
ered, without doing damage to the sections which can be covered, for the 
sections are relatively independent of one another. For example, the one 
hundred pages devoted to state power to tax could well be deferred for 
consideration in a separate course in state and local taxation without sig-
nificantly affecting the classroom treatment of state power to regulate. 
In any case, we tend too generally to lament the apparently continued 
expansion of constitutional law casebooks in recent years. It is interest-
ing to recall, for instance, that Professor Thayer's casebook/ which was 
published in 1895 (when constitutional law was surely no more compli-
cated than it is now), required 2434 pages to cover the subject. 
Roughly half of all the principal cases considered in the casebook here 
reviewed were decided by the Supreme Court since 1950-a fact which 
confirms another declared aim of the editors: to examine the trends of 
the law. Viewed another way, roughly half of all the principal cases con-
cern themselves with limitations on government power which can be 
loosely described as limitations involving civil rights and civil liberties. 
This emphasis necessarily contracts the sections on judicial review and 
federalism, but here again the editors are faithful to their declared pur-
pose of emphasizing the trends of the law. In the 1963-1964 Term, for 
instance, forty of the fifty Supreme Court decisions accompanied by an 
opinion and concerned with constitutional questions were within the 
civil rights and civil liberties field. With eighty per cent of the Court's 
constitutional opinions thus directed, the editors' allocation of a little 
more than half of their materials to that subject is a fairly conservative 
acknowledgment of the trend. 
As a matter of fact, the one major oversight of the book may be in its 
omission of cases and materials which would deal more adequately with 
an aspect of civil rights and civil liberties of great significance today, 
namely, the scope and constitutional bases of federal civil rights statutes. 
Screws v. United States3 and Williams v. United States/ which have 
nearly emasculated the two major criminal statutes5 on constitutional 
grounds, are not treated as principal cases. Nor is Collins v. Hardyman/ 
which very nearly junked the civil analogue to section 241.7 Monroe v. 
2. THAYER, CAsEs oN CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw (1895). 
3. 325 u.s. 91 (1945). 
4. 341 u.s. 70 (1951). 
5. 18 u.s.c. §§ 241,242 (1958). 
6. 341 u.s. 651 (1951). 
7. REv. STAT.§ 1980(3) (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958). 
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Pape,8 which rescued section 19839 from oblivion and which makes it the 
single most useful federal civil rights remedy outside the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964/0 is never mentioned. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is treated 
rather slightingly, and many other statutes descriptive of federal civil 
rights authority are never considered. Many of these materials are cov-
ered in competitive casebooks, and their omission from this volume is a 
serious defect, especially in view of the general emphasis of the book on 
civil rights and liberties. 
It may be that the editors considered that treatment of these statutes 
and their interpretative cases would be inappropriate in the basic consti-
tutional law course. Disagreement with this point of view might be based 
on several considerations. First, the scope and construction of these stat-
utes have considerable relevance to basic issues of federalism, which is 
part of the foundation of a solid course in constitutional law. Secondly, 
the interpretative cases provide some insights into techniques of judicial 
analysis not provided equally well by other cases. Thirdly, the statutes 
have a political and practical importance which ought not to be reserved 
for consideration only by those few students who may find their way into 
some small civil rights seminar. There being no other major course in 
the usual law school curriculum where consideration of these statutes 
would be more appropriate than in constitutional law, they should be 
covered in constitutional law. This is not to insist, of course, that every 
teacher should take them up; but it would have been helpful had the 
editors made it possible to deal with them. Since this casebook should 
otherwise enjoy its greatest success among those most interested in the 
civil rights and liberties area of constitutional law, the omission seems 
even more unfortunate. 
On balance, however, the book is excellent, particularly in the selec-
tion of materials and questions to supplement the cases. This selection 
does a great deal to place the book easily among the best available, and 
possibly to make it the very best for stimulating a critical examination of 
constitutional law. 
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